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On Zermelo’s theorem1
Rabah Amir2 and Igor V. Evstigneev3
Abstract. A famous result in game theory known as Zermelo’s
theorem says that ”in chess either White can force a win, or Black can
force a win, or both sides can force at least a draw”. The present paper
extends this result to the class of all finite-stage two-player games of
complete information with alternating moves. It is shown that in any
such game either the first player has a winning strategy, or the second
player has a winning strategy, or both have unbeatable strategies.
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1. In this note we generalize the following proposition usually referred to
in the modern game-theoretic literature as Zermelo’s theorem (see the paper
[6] by Zermelo and its discussion and further references in [5]).
Theorem 1. In chess either White has a winning strategy, or Black has
a winning strategy, or both have strategies guaranteeing at least a draw.
The main result of this paper is as follows.
Theorem 2. In any finite-stage two-player game with alternating moves,
either (i) player 1 has a winning strategy, or (ii) player 2 has a winning
strategy, or (iii) both have unbeatable strategies.
We emphasize that in this theorem we speak of any finite-stage two-
player game with alternating moves, with any action sets and any real-valued
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Yurii Khomskii for fruitful discussions and helpful comments.
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payoff functions, so that the formulation of the result has a maximum level
of generality.
The notions of unbeatable and winning strategies are defined in the gen-
eral context as follows (cf. [1,4]). Consider a game of two players who select
strategies ξ and η from some sets and get payoffs U(ξ, η) and V (ξ, η). We
call a strategy ξ of player 1 unbeatable ( resp. winning) if U(ξ, η) ≥ V (ξ, η)
(resp. U(ξ, η) > V (ξ, η)) for any η. Unbeatable and winning strategies η of
player 2 are defined analogously in terms of the inequalities U(ξ, η) ≤ V (ξ, η)
and U(ξ, η) < V (ξ, η) holding for each ξ.
The notions introduced are regarded in this work as primitive game so-
lution concepts. We do not try to reduce them to the conventional ones:
saddle point, Nash equilibrium, dominant strategy or their versions. This
approach, contrasting with the common game-theoretic methodology, con-
stitutes the main element of novelty in this paper. It enables us to obtain
the above result in its most general and natural form.
2. In a finite-stage game with alternating moves, players 1 and 2 make
moves (take actions) sequentially by selecting elements from two given action
sets A and B. At stage 0 player 1 makes a move a0; then player 2, having
observed the player 1’s move a0, makes a move b0 = y0(a0). At stage 1 player
1 makes a move a1 = x1(a0, b0) depending on the previous moves a0 and b0;
then player 2 makes a move b1 = y1(a0, b0, a1), and so on. At stage t (t ≤ N)
player 1 makes a move at = xt(a
t−1, bt−1) depending on the sequences of the
previous actions
at−1 = (a0, a1, a2, ..., at−1) and b
t−1 = (b0, b1, b2, ..., bt−1)
up to time t − 1, and then player 2 makes a move yt(a
t, bt−1) depending on
at = (a0, a1, a2, ..., at) and b
t−1 = (b0, b1, b2, ..., bt−1). The game terminates at
stage N , where N is some given natural number.
A strategy of player 1 is a sequence
ξ = {x0, x1(a
0, b0), x2(a
1, b1), x3(a
2, b2), ..., xN (a
N−1, bN−1)}
where x0 is the initial action of player 1 and xt(a
t−1, bt−1) (1 ≤ t ≤ N) is a
function specifying what move at = xt(a
t−1, bt−1) should be made at stage t
given the history (at−1, bt−1) of the previous moves of the players. To specify
a strategy of player 2 one has to specify a sequence of functions
η = {y0(a
0), y1(a
1, b0), y2(a
2, b1), ..., yN(a
N , bN−1)}
indicating what move bt = yt(a
t, bt−1) should be made at stage t given the
history (at, bt−1) of the previous moves of the players.
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The outcome of the game h(ξ, η) resulting from the application of the
strategies ξ and η is described by the whole history of play
h(ξ, η) = (aN , bN ) = (a0, a1, a2, ..., aN , b0, b1, b2, ..., bN ).
Once the outcome h(ξ, η) of the game is known, the players get their payoffs
U(ξ, η) = u(h(ξ, η)) and V (ξ, η) = v(h(ξ, η)), where u(h) and v(h) are the
given payoff functions defined for all histories h.
In the course of the proof of Theorem 2, we will establish the existence
of winning and unbeatable strategies having a special structure: basic strate-
gies. We call a strategy basic if moves of the player using this strategy
depend only on the previous moves of the rival (there is no need to mem-
orize your own moves). Thus a basic strategy of player 1 is a sequence
ξ = {x0, x1(b
0), x2(b
1), ..., xN(b
N−1)} and a basic strategy of player 2 is a
sequence η = {y0(a
0), y1(a
1), y2(a
2), ..., yN(a
N )}.
3. In chess, possible actions/moves of players 1 and 2 (White and Black)
can be identified with positions on the board. When selecting a move, the
player selects a new position. The payoffs, depending on the history of play,
are defined as follows. If White wins then White gets 1 and Black 0; if
Black wins then Black gets 1 and White 0; in case of a draw, both get
1/2. Illegitimate moves (or sequences of moves) lead, by definition, to a zero
payoff for the corresponding player. Winning strategies defined above in the
general context correspond to winning strategies in chess, and unbeatable
ones to those strategies in chess which guarantee at least a draw.
It is assumed that chess is a finite-stage game, which is justified by the
following argument. There is a finite number of chess-pieces and a finite
number of squares on the board, hence there is a finite number of possible
positions. The game automatically terminates as a draw if the same position
occurs at least three times, with the same player having to go. Therefore the
game cannot last more than N stages, where N is a sufficiently large number.
4. For any history of play h, define f(h) = u(h)− v(h). Before proving
Theorem 2, we state two auxiliary propositions.
Proposition 1. A strategy ξ of player 1 is winning (resp. unbeatable) if
for any sequence bN = (b0, ..., bN) of moves of player 2, f(h(ξ, b
N)) > 0 (resp.
f(h(ξ, bN)) ≥ 0). A strategy η of player 2 is winning (resp. unbeatable) if for
any sequence aN = (a0, ..., aN) of moves of player 1, f(h(a
N , η)) < 0 (resp.
f(h(aN , η)) ≤ 0).
Proof. The first assertion follows from the fact that for every strategy
profile (ξ, η) the outcome h(ξ, η) of the game coincides with h(ξ, bN) where
bN = (b0, ..., bN ) is the sequence of moves of player 2 generated by the strategy
profile (ξ, η). The second assertion is a consequence of the fact that for every
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strategy profile (ξ, η) the outcome h(ξ, η) of the game coincides with h(aN , η)
where aN = (a0, ..., aN) is the sequence of moves of player 1 generated by the
strategy profile (ξ, η). 
Proposition 2. One of the assertions (i) - (iii) listed in Theorem 2 holds
if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(I) Either player 1 has a winning strategy, or player 2 has an unbeatable
strategy.
(II) Either player 2 has a winning strategy, or player 1 has an unbeatable
strategy.
Proof. ”If”. Suppose (I) and (II) hold. Let us show that one of the
assertions (i)-(iii) holds. If (i) is valid, the assertion is proved. Suppose (i)
is not valid. Then by virtue of (I), player 2 has an unbeatable strategy. If
(ii) holds, the assertion is proved. Suppose not only (i) but also (ii) fails to
hold. Then by virtue of (I) and (II), (iii) holds.
”Only if”. If (i) (resp. (ii)) holds, then player 1 (resp. player 2) has a
winning, and consequently, unbeatable strategy, which implies (I) and (II).
Similarly, (iii) yields (I) and (II). 
5. Proof of Theorem 2 (cf. [2, pp. 147-148] and [3]). According to the
duality principle of first-order logic, the propositions
(P) ∃x0 ∀b0 ∃x1(b
0) ∀b1 ∃x2(b
1) ... ∀bN−1 ∃xN (b
N−1) ∀bN :
f(x0, x1(b
0), x2(b
1), ..., xN(b
N−1), b0, b1, b2, ..., bN ) > 0
and
(P¯) ∀a0 ∃y0(a
0) ∀a1 ∃y1(a
1) ∀a2 ∃y2(a
2) ... ∀aN ∃yN(a
N ) :
f(a0, a1, a2, ..., aN , y0(a
0), y1(a
1), y2(a
2), ..., yN(a
N )) ≤ 0
are the negations of each other, and so either (P) or (P¯) holds. If (P) holds,
then player 1 has a winning basic strategy {x0, x1(b
0), x2(b
1), ..., xN (b
N−1)}.
If (P¯) is valid, then player 2 has an unbeatable basic strategy {y0(a
0), y1(a
1),
y2(a
2),..., yN(a
N )}. This proves (I). To prove (II) replace in the above argu-
ment f by −f . 
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